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Abstract 
The regulation of industrial pollution is clearly difficult in a rapidly industrializing, low-
income setting. In addition to the general lack of resources for monitoring and enforcement, 
authorities must deal with the asymmetric nature of the information and multiple nonpoint 
sources of pollution. In this study we look at efforts to regulate chemical plants in Ankleshwar, 
in the Indian state of Gujarat. The plants are located in an industrial estate, which provides 
interesting preconditions for a form of two-tier regulation, in which an industry association 
becomes an intermediary between the government and individual firms: it monitors its members’ 
pollution and promotes compliance with the government’s environmental regulations. The Indian 
agency responsible for environmental protection cannot effectively control the many small 
individual plants within such estates. The local industry association is much better informed and 
has an incentive to regulate its members to maintain a good reputation but does not possess much 
formal authority, and its voluntary monitoring and abatement program is akin to managing a 
common property resource. We study four preconditions for the success of such management: 
suitable design principles, effective monitoring, objective implementation of rules, and 
enforcement. We show that these conditions are satisfied at least to some extent in Ankleshwar 
and that the fines decrease pollution. 
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Monitoring and Enforcement: Is Two-Tier Regulation Robust? 
Vinish Kathuria and Thomas Sterner∗ 
1. Introduction 
The failure of industrial pollution control in many developing countries is due both to 
rigid command-and-control regulatory approaches and to the large number of small-scale and 
informal sector pollution sources that lack knowledge, funds, technology and skills to treat their 
effluent. This nonpoint source pollution aggravates the problems of regulators already 
constrained by meager resources and limited authority. Low remuneration also invites 
corruption. In settings marked by large unemployment, these weaknesses may together seriously 
impair the ability of the environmental regulatory agency to conduct effective monitoring and 
enforcement (Pargal and Wheeler 1996; Mookherjee and Png 1992, 1995). The problems are 
compounded by information asymmetries. 
The design of policy instruments for industrial pollution is, in fact, a complex task. The 
regulator can in principle use an array of physical, legal, monetary, and other instruments 
(Sterner 2002). In the past few years information disclosure and rating have become the center of 
attention in what is sometimes referred to as the “third wave” of environmental policy 
(Tietenberg 1998). For developing countries in which regulatory authorities lack the resources to 
use conventional instruments, information disclosure may at least be an important first step. One 
of the pillars of this approach is the inclusion of all stakeholders—community, industry, 
consumers, and nongovernmental organizations, along with government and media 
representatives (Wheeler et al. 2000). It explicitly acknowledges the difficulties of monitoring 
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and enforcement and recognizes that there are many more avenues of influence than just through 
formal regulation or monetary charges. Firms are sensitive, for example, about their reputations 
and the future costs they may incur as a result of liability or accidents. The emergence of this 
new paradigm for regulation is also related to the advances made during the past decades in our 
understanding of asymmetric information. In a setting where the principal has few resources, the 
agents are many, and the issue to be regulated is complex and hence expensive to monitor, this 
asymmetry is problematic.  
The policy instrument choices are not a simple tax versus regulation, but rather a mix of 
policies including regulations, information provision, subsidies, charges, and provision of public 
goods, all molded together through a process of policy dialogue in which the stakeholders really 
take part. Attention is paid to the implicit property rights to the environment and to the balance 
of power between regulators and industry. Sanctions are carefully graduated to avoid alienating 
polluters; attention is paid to the use and not just collection of charges; and regulations are 
carefully timed to avoid unnecessary costs to industry. Another policy involves peer monitoring, 
as in the framework of common property resource management. 
Indian chemical firms are clustered in industrial estates. These estates have two important 
characteristics that may make them useful intermediaries in the regulatory process: (a) they are at 
least partly democratic or cooperative structures managed by their respective industry 
associations, and (b) they have information on pollution and technology. Although aggregate 
pollution from an industrial estate is clearly noticeable and attracts attention, it is very difficult 
for regulators and residents to monitor individual plants. Given the size of the task, the costs 
involved, and its own limited budget, the state regulatory agency, the Gujarat Pollution Control 
Board (GPCB), can resort to two-tier regulation by delegating monitoring and enforcement to the 
estate. The industry association not only has higher monitoring efficiency, which raises the 
marginal expected penalty for the plant, but it may also lower the plant’s marginal abatement 
cost (especially if the firm is small) by providing technical and other support. Two-tier regulation 
has advantages in monitoring but does not solve the problems of collective action, such as free 
riding. Nevertheless, the association has an incentive for self-regulation, since it must consider 
the effect on all its members if the estate draws bad publicity. This implies that the reputation of 
the estate is a form of common good, or a common pool resource. 
There is a vast literature on social dilemmas, free riding, and the management of common 
pool resources, from which we can draw hypotheses concerning the sustainability of an 
arrangement like two-tier monitoring. Ostrom (1990) focuses on three major puzzles of common 
action: the supply of the common good, achieving sustained commitment to the group, and Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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designing appropriate incentives for mutual monitoring. By way of a guide she summarizes 
seven design principles that are prerequisites to sustainable management of a common pool 
resource. With the wording adapted for our context, the principles are as follows: 
1.  Because free access to a resource is likely to lead to overutilization, membership and 
the rights and obligations that go with it must be clearly defined.  
2.  The rules governing the rights and obligations must be proportionate to one another 
and appropriate for the local conditions. 
3.  Structures for decisionmaking should be democratic. 
4.  Monitoring must be effective, and monitors should be either the participants 
themselves or at least accountable at the local level. 
5.  Reasonable and credible sanctions are needed. They are often carefully graduated to 
avoid alienating first-time offenders. Monitoring itself is often rewarded to create 
incentives for mutual monitoring. 
6. Appropriate  mechanisms  for  conflict resolution are needed. 
7.  Finally, some recognition by external government authorities is also needed. 
This paper evaluates to what extent the Ankleshwar Industrial Estate (AIE) has been able 
to meet those design principles. Section 2 gives some background on industrial estates in India 
and AIE in particular. We then look at various aspects of behavior within the estate. Section 3 
focuses on the provision of common goods such as effluent treatment and the rules concerning 
use and cost sharing; section 4 looks at the structure of fines; section 5 is an analysis of their 
effect on effluents; and section 6 takes a look at the distribution of fines on different types of 
firms to assess whether they appear to be levied fairly. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Pollution Control in Industrial Estates  
India’s industrial estates were originally a tool for industrial dispersal. At the time of 
independence, industries were heavily concentrated in a few regions of the country—essentially 
around major cities like Calcutta, Bombay, Kanpur, and Madras; the rest of the country was 
largely unindustrialized. In 1971 planners identified as “backward” about 245 districts, 
comprising 60% of the population and 70% of the area of the country. Alongside other policies, 
such as capital investment subsidies, transport subsidies, and income tax concessions, was an 
Industrial Estates Programme that sought to locate industries in such areas. Besides promoting Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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development by building infrastructure, the program was intended to generate competitiveness 
through agglomeration economies. At present, there are nearly 867 industrial estates in India 
(CPCB 2001, 2). In Gujarat alone, the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) has 
set up 257 industrial estates, of which 169 are currently operational (see http://www.gidc.gov.in). 
The environmental awareness of the industrial estates grew in the late 1980s, when the 
industries’ development corporations began developing effluent collection networks, combined 
effluent treatment plants, disposal systems for treated effluents, and tree plantations. Currently, 
the industrial estates also serve as zoning devices and are an instrument of policy by which state 
authorities can, in principle, prevent development in ecologically sensitive or heavily populated 
areas. Even within estates, separate zones for pharmaceuticals, dyes, and pesticides can be a tool 
to reduce air pollution and facilitate better waste collection and disposal efforts.1  
AIE is the largest chemical estate in Asia, covering 16 square kilometers and housing 
more than 400 chemical plants.2 Its situation on the Bombay-Delhi railway makes it highly 
visible. Its plants process large quantities of basic chemicals, solvents, acids, and fuels to 
manufacture more than 25% of Gujarat’s (5% of India’s) output of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
pesticides, dyes, and intermediaries. Assuming the share of pollution is commensurate, AIE may 
be producing 5% of India’s total chemical pollution in just 16 square kilometers. AIE has 
estimated that its members generate between 250 million and 270 million liters of liquid waste 
per day, and roughly 50,000 tons of solid waste annually (Bruno 1995). Ankleshwar’s 
Amlakhadi3 Creek is completely void of biological life. According to India’s Central Pollution 
Control Board (CPCB), of the five possible classes of water quality, A to E, the Amlakhadi is 
below E. Already the groundwater in neighboring villages has been affected, allegedly leading to 
the death of some cattle. 
AIE encourages pollution abatement among its units with such instruments as provision 
of information, direct regulation of emissions at individual units, and fines if a unit’s emissions 
                                                 
1 This kind of zoning is being tried by GIDC in new estates. Also in other countries, industrial estates are being used 
as zoning devices to reduce pollution (see Israngkura 2000, 87). 
2 The industrial estate houses 1,600 small, medium, and large units in different sectors, including pharmaceuticals, 
dyes, chemicals, pesticides, engineering, and plastics. 
3 The Amlakhadi Creek is 14 kilometers long; it carries effluents from the Ankleshwar, Panoli, and Jhagadia 
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exceed the standards.4 According to Ostrom (1990), all efforts to organize collective action must 
address a common set of problems—coping with free riding, solving commitment problems, 
arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of 
rules. The solution to most of these problems becomes more tractable if the institution has 
suitable design characteristics. Figure 1 gives the schematic diagram of two-tier decisionmaking 
in the case of AIE.  
Figure 1: Two-Tier Decisionmaking to Control and Mitigate Pollution
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF)








(e.g., AIA of AIE)
Individual Plants
Tier I
Tier II Common Effluent
Treatment + Advice
 
3. Collective Action to Reduce Pollution and Outside Monitoring Pressure  
If we consider what common goods or services the Ankelshwar Industries Association 
(AIA) could provide its members, two stand out as most important. First is technology to reduce 
                                                 
4 In the past few years many industry associations have initiated such precautionary steps. This may be due to easier 
access to public information and legislative changes (through public interest litigation), along with highly publicized 
accidents, such as Bhopal, which seem to have made polluters more conscious of the risk of legal action. Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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or treat effluents and waste, and thereby reduce attention from regulators.5 Second is less 
frequent inspections by GPCB—something specifically mentioned by many firms in our 
interviews as the main benefit of membership in the common effluent treatment plant . The 
inspections take time, and the inspectors expect special treatment, which is onerous and troubling 
for the firms. The two goals are closely interrelated since reduced attention by the authorities is 
brought about by lower pollution, which in turn is a result of both technical investments and 
changes in behavior among the firms. The two main pieces of infrastructure to reduce or treat 
effluents provided by AIA are a common effluent treatment plant and a centralized landfill 
facility. 
The effluent treatment plant was initially built6 for the small firms; most of the medium 
and large units had their own treatment plants. Most small firms are unable to provide such 
facilities on their own, as they are constrained by space, capital, and expertise. Because of their 
large number and small size, they may be perceived almost as nonpoint sources, and thus, unlike 
large firms, cannot be easily forced to treat their waste and take sufficient safety precautions 
(Gorter 1996). However, in an industrial estate there is such a concentration of small firms that 
the effect of releasing untreated waste into open drains is catastrophic.  
The Ankleshwar plant is the first in Gujarat to do primary,7 secondary, and tertiary 
treatment and has been awarded ISO 14000 certification. Treatment yields treated effluent and 
solid waste or sludge. The treated effluent flows into an underground collection system and is 
then discharged into Amlakhadi Creek. The cost of this underground drainage, built by the 
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, has been shared by the industries through capital 
contribution charges. The recurring cost is being recovered from the industries through a levy of 
drainage charges at the rate of Rs. 2 per kiloliter of water consumed.  
                                                 
5 Creating good publicity is another important AIA activity. To quote AIA: “(L)ong before the Judicial activism and 
various environmental groups started their crusade to safeguard the environment, AIA realised its responsibilities 
and registered a public charitable trust on 26
th April 1989 by the name of Ankleshwar Environment Preservation 
Society, AEPS” (AIA 1999). Besides planting trees and creating awareness, AEPS aims (i) to assist industries in 
controlling air pollution and in disposal of their solid and liquid waste; and (ii) to set up a laboratory for testing stack 
air and liquid effluent samples. AEPS was also in 1994 one of the very first to be successful in getting pollution 
control projects eligible for tax concessions. 
6 As early as in 1988, the Gujarat state government ordered GIDC to develop treatment plants for Ankleshwar, but 
little progress was made till 1995 (Bruno 1995).  
7 Considerable debate took place concerning whether to mandate all units to carry out at least primary treatment in-
house. The experience from other estates, however, showed that the small firms were often incapable of doing this 
properly, and the effort created more problems than it solved. Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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The other residue of the effluent treatment plant, solid waste, also needs to be disposed of 
properly. Although some medium and large units have their own disposal pits, as recently as 
1997 many were disposing of sludge and solid waste in the open or even discharging it back into 
the drains (Down to Earth 1998). Thus, it was decided that a centralized facility was needed for 
proper disposal of the hazardous sludge, and AIA took the initiative to develop it. The 
Ankleshwar Environment Protection Society (AEPS) in collaboration with the National 
Productivity Council, Delhi, conducted an environmental impact analysis based on guidelines 
from the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the World Bank. This is the first site in India 
where a public consultation process was carried out according to these guidelines.8 The landfill 
facility was developed under German standards and is paid for exclusively by AIA and its 
members except for a 50% subsidy in land procurement. The banks may have been wary of 
financing it, since the landfill had already generated negative publicity, but we do not have any 
evidence. 
                                                 
8 In fact, the public consultation process in Ankleshwar grew out of a previous instance of bad publicity in 1996, 
when an attempt to set up a landfill in an adjoining village was aborted after stiff local resistance and a public 
interest lawsuit (Down to Earth 1998). Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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Table 1: Financing of Centralized Effluent Treatment and Solid Waste Landfill Facilities 
Item  Effluent treatment plant  Solid waste landfill 
Financing (Rs. million)  Land: subsidy from GIDC  Land: 50% subsidy from GIDC 
  Equity                          12.000  
Subsidy from GIDC    10.000  
IDBI
a term loan          33.000  
AIA member deposit  15.806  
Total                            70.806  
Equity and deposit                9.80 
Subsidy                                  
IDBI term loan                  
Total                                    9.80 
Members   193
b 206 
Membership fee (Rs.)  10,000 fixed  1,500 
Membership profile  In principle only small firms
c Any  unit 
Operating charges (Rs.)  8 + chemical oxygen demand load 
per kiloliter
d 
365 per metric ton + transportation 
charges 
Treatment charges as 
recovered from members 
(Rs. million) 
1996–97                           3.779 
1997–98                         49.484 
1998 (April–December) 4.893 
1996–97                           – Nil  
1997–98                           – Nil 
1998 (April–December)    – 3.9 
Sources: AIA (1999); brochures of the effluent treatment and solid waste landfill facilities; and Enviro Tech. Ltd. 
members’ list. 
a IDBI is the Industrial Development Bank of India. 
b Including four units from another industrial estate (Panoli).  
c Two multinational corporations and one former subsidiary of a multinational are also members.  
d  If a unit has no effluent, it still has to pay Rs. 1,500 for a tanker. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of capital and operating costs. Note that the outside 
subsidy is limited and that the firms bear most of the costs. Land has been provided at a 
concessional rate by GIDC, which has also given Rs. 10 million covering 14% of the total cost of 
setting up the effluent treatment plant. The association has thus managed to cover the largest 
share of capital costs and also bears the recurring operating costs. The way in which operating 
costs are shared has been a source of discord within the association, however. Several large units 
are members even though subsidies were intended for small firms’ effluent treatment. As can be 
seen from the table, there are both fixed (membership) fees and variable operating costs. 
Naturally, the small firms complain that the fixed costs are unfair and seek to base fees on a 
variable basis. Since monitoring is very difficult, such an arrangement would create incentives to 
pass untreated effluent into the drains. Thus we observe the classic dilemma between 
distributional and efficiency goals. Still, it seems that the tariff structure could be improved to 
allow for greater flexibility for the smallest firms, which have to pay a fixed charge even when 
they do not generate enough waste for a tanker (see note d).   Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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4. Effluent Monitoring and Imposition of Fines 
The mere provision of infrastructure is of course not enough. To achieve an acceptable 
environmental performance, the behavior of firms must also be modified to discourage 
inappropriate actions. Individual firms may save costs by not complying while benefiting from 
the positive effects of others’ compliance. To overcome the temptation for free riding, some 
sanctions are needed, and following point 5 of Ostrom’s design principles, it is generally the case 
that sustainable common pool resources need to have a carefully designed system of graduated 
sanctions.  
Table 2: Graduated Sanctions Imposed by AIA 
 
Penalty (in Rs.)  Pollution Measure  Recurrence 
Small firms Medium and 
large firms
Remarks 




4 Reporting to GPCB
Pumping acidic effluent into 
drainage. 
pH (b)    20,000  50,000  Other discharge methods. 
1 500  2,000 
2 1,000  4,000 
3 5,000  20,000 
Suspended 
solids 
4 Reporting  to  GPCB 
Month 1: no penalty. 
Month 2: penalty with 300 ppm 
limit. 









Beyond 25,000 7,500 75,000
Control takes longer but is needed 
to keep parity with small firms 
whose effluent is treated in 
common treatment plant. 
Review after six months. 
1 1,000  4,000 
2 2,500  10,000 




4 Reporting  to  GPCB 
Two types of air pollution: from 
process or incinerator. Penalty is 
more severe if incinerator is acidic.
Tractor 1,000  4,000  Hazardous 
Truck 2,500  10,000 




hazardous  Truck 1,000  4,000 
1: penalty if dumping outside the 
landfill.  
2: double penalty.  
3: triple penalty. 
4: reporting to GPCB. 
Source: AIA (1998a). Monitoring is by AEPS. Units may challenge results within seven days. Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
10 
Monitoring and imposition of fines are the most important instruments employed by AIA 
to control the release of pollution in the estate. AEPS is responsible for monitoring and has 
adopted the following procedure. Two effluent samples are taken from each chemical unit every 
month. If samples exceed the GPCB standards in pH, chemical oxygen demand, or other 
indicators, the test reports are sent to the environment committee of AIA. The committee calls 
the concerned units for discussion, and if the firms remain in noncompliance, financial penalties 
are levied or other sanctions imposed. Table 2 gives the structure of the penalties for each type of 
measure and industry size group. 
Note that the penalty (except for chemical oxygen demand) increases with both the 
severity of the infringement and the frequency with which the polluter has violated rules in the 
past. This is exactly the main feature Ostrom considers important. The last “threat point” 
punishment to which AIA resorts after repeated infractions (or nonpayment of penalties) is 
reporting the polluter to GPCB. This is critical: some form of ultimate threat is needed because 
the association does not have the authority to force plants to pay fines or to close them down. On 
the other hand, AIA is not keen to report polluters to GPCB because this is a sign of failure, and 
such reports may lead to inspection not only of the unit but of the whole estate, with dramatic 
social ramifications if plants are closed, given the high unemployment in the region. In the 
period studied, up till early 1999, on only three occasions did AIA reported defaulters to GPCB.9 
Clearly, GPCB’s response to reports will also be important for the success of AIA’s “voluntary” 
activities in future monitoring and detection situations. 
The major difference between government and AIA monitoring is that the participants 
themselves have framed the rules in light of the information they have. According to Ostrom 
(1990, 17), the self-interest of those who have negotiated the rules will lead them to monitor one 
another and report observed infractions so that the rules are enforced. The agency, however, 
hires its monitors and thus faces the principal-agent problem of ensuring that they do their job. 
5. Monitoring Effectiveness 
Successful monitoring should lead to compliance and lower pollution. Unfortunately, the 
data we have to test for this are incomplete and show only pH and suspended solids of the 
                                                 
9 Source: Personal communication with the executive committee member of AIA on March 6, 1999. Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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effluent from the estate for 1998.10 The sampling point is at Valia Chokdi, after the effluent has 
been treated by individual units and the common treatment plant, and is at the mouth of the 
Amlakhadi. AEPS takes three effluent samples a day. Figure 2 gives the monthly averages and 
extreme values for pH for the month. 
 
Figure 2. Trend and Range of pH during 1998 
The figure shows some improvement over the period studied: the effluent has become 
less acidic.11 This change could be due to (1) stricter regulations through enforcement of 
penalties; (2) seasonal variation, such as dilution by monsoon rains; or (3) increased publicity 
leading to behavioral changes in the firms. To get some idea of these effects, a model is 
formulated that explains the variation in the effluent characteristics in the estate. 
The effluent characteristic from a plant in an industrial estate depends on a number of 
factors, including technology used, production level, abatement, and management attention. 
Lacking data on production levels or technology, we will assume these are constant during the 
                                                 
10 pH and suspended solids may not be ideal or unique indicators of water pollution, but unfortunately they are the 
only indicators we have.  
11 Data for suspended solids were similar but were not considered for our analysis since CPCB does not stipulate 
any standard for suspended solids in its designated-best-use water classification. 
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year. The main variable on which we focus is perceived detection probability for discharge of 
untreated effluent. We assume that evidence of enhanced monitoring will be taken as an 
indication of a high probability of detection if untreated effluent is discharged. As a 
consequence, plants will prefer to treat their effluent before discharge rather than risk being 
caught. Thus effluent quality will be a function of monitoring. We also assume that illegal 
disposal may be less detectable at certain times of day. Since AEPS takes samples at 8 a.m.,       
4 p.m., and 12 midnight, corresponding to the three work shifts, we included shift dummies. We 
are also open to the possibility that dumping may vary by day of the week, depending on details 
in the schedule of monitoring that are unknown to us but may be known to the plants. Samples 
are not taken on public holidays; discharge of untreated effluent on these days would be 
manifested in samples taken immediately after the holiday. To account for this, a holiday dummy 
is included in the model. Finally, since the samples are taken in a river, water flow will be 
decisive. Local daily rainfall figures over the year, obtained from the meteorological office in 
Ahmedabad, should give a good proxy for water flow. To capture other seasonal variations and 
development over time, monthly dummies and a time trend are included. 
Further, there may be short-term effects from one shift to another. Many technical 
processes involve the use of intermediary storage tanks, and if a tank is emptied in one period, 
giving high values, the following period may be cleaner. Alternatively, one might also find some 
form of persistence effect—that is, if the effluent quality is extremely bad in one shift, the effect 
may persist into the next shift. To capture such effects, a lagged value of the dependent variable 
is included. Thus, the model to be estimated is 
 
Et = f(Et-1, M, Shift, Weekday, Holiday, Time, Month, Rainfall)                               (1) 
 
The measure of pollution used is deviation from normal of the acidity or alkalinity of the effluent 
as measured by its pH. Clean water has a pH of (approximately) 7.0, and deviations either up or 
down imply the presence of some chemical pollution. Thus, in our analysis, the quality of the Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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effluent (i.e., the dependent variable, Et) has been defined as the deviation from the neutral value 
of 7: | pH – 7.0 |.12  
The most interesting variable is the monitoring plus enforcement in the estate. Each 
chemical plant is sampled regularly, and if samples exceed the standard, the defaulting units are 
notified and penalties are imposed. Compliance hinges on the periodicity and effectiveness of 
enforcement—that is, how frequently fines are imposed and collected. The ideal variable here 
would have been the firm’s estimate of the perceived likelihood of being fined and of the fines’ 
being collected. We do not have information on individual fines and much less on expectations. 
We do know, however, that fines13 have been issued only a very limited number of times; we 
have the dates of those occasions and the number of notices issued each time. We hypothesize 
that each such event has a considerable signaling effect within the industrial estate. Since the 
estate is a close-knit community, the issuance of a notice will be well known to all units. In the 
days immediately following the highly publicized issuance of notices, the plants will be 
reminded of AIA’s monitoring efforts and thus be more cautious with their effluent. The variable 
M has been constructed based on the assumption of adaptive expectations. It is equal to the 
number of fine letters issued for the three days after the notice is issued and then set equal to 
zero.14 
The Breusch-Pagan test gave a chi-square value of 176.41 for 20 degrees of freedom, 
which is much higher than the tabulated value, thereby indicating the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the data.15 The model is thus estimated with White’s (1980) correction for 
unknown form of heteroscedasticity. Table 3 gives the results for the heteroscedasticity-corrected 
model. 
                                                 
12 Since pH is in logarithmic scale (a pH of 4 is 10 times as bad as a pH of 5), the ideal measure should have been 
10
|pH–7.0|, but this introduced considerable heteroscedasticity in the model. We thus used |pH–7.0|, which implies that 
our model may actually be interpreted as exponential. 
13 We have data on penalty letters for chemical oxygen demand violations, but the effluent parameters measured at 
the end of the estate are pH and suspended solids. We are aware that the relationship between chemical oxygen 
demand and pH may be very complex, but these were the only data available, and furthermore, fines were assessed 
only for severe violations that would probably have affected both indicators heavily.  
14 Other lags were tested but did not give clearer results. 
15 A possible bias could arise from measurement error in the dependent variable. To deal with this, a Probit model 
was estimated with the dependent variable taking the value 1 if 6.0 ≤ pH ≤7.0 and zero otherwise. The results are not 
reported, since the predictive power of the model was low. This in turn suggests that a model on the actual values of 
the dependent variable is preferred.  Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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Table 3: Effectiveness of Penalties: Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) Estimates 
 
Variable  Dependent variable = | pH – 7 | 
lag(pH) -0.151*  (3.36) 
lag(RAIN) -0.0049*  (2.56) 
PENALTY -0.0063**  (2.0) 
Time -0.0041  (0.82) 
HOLIDAY 0.1  (0.52) 
SHIFT1 0.377*  (3.98) 
SHIFT3 0.095  (1.07) 





Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values. Asterisks * and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Data 
are for January–August, for which we had all variables. Some month and day dummies were also significant. 
The lagged dependent value is negative, suggesting that larger deviations in one shift lead 
to smaller deviations in the next. With respect to the dilution effect of rainfall, the variable is 
significantly negative, as expected. This implies that rainfall in the region leads to improvement 
in water quality the following day. 
The signs and significance levels of shift dummies (SHIFT1 and SHIFT3) suggest that the 
maximum deviation is for samples collected in the morning (shift 1). That is, units may be 
discharging untreated effluents at night. The samples collected at midnight were also elevated, 
but the difference is not statistically significant. Since the discharge of acidic or untreated 
effluent would be visible during the day, units may refrain from discharging untreated effluent 
during the second shift. 
The effect of holidays is not statistically significant, although it has the expected sign. 
With respect to weekday dummies, none of the days seem to have any effect on water quality, 
perhaps because of the absence of a unified weekly schedule. The industrial estate observes a 
staggered schedule because of problems in its electric power supply, and units take turns in 
having one day off. Thus all days are symmetric and there is no “weekend” or other pattern to 
observe. Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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The penalties variable was found to be significant. These results suggest that monitoring, 
as proxied by penalty notices, does appear to have a deterrence effect in altering the units’ 
behavior. When periods longer than three days were chosen, however, the effect was weak or 
absent.  
6. Levying and Collecting Fines 
The fines serve several purposes: (a) to induce compliance in mitigating the pollution and 
deter illegal disposal, (b) to remove any competitive advantage for those firms that do not 
comply, and (c) to finance the current and future monitoring and testing activities of AEPS. The 
short life of the deterrence effect may be explained by the difficulty of actually collecting the 
fines. Since having to pay a fine is a more severe punishment than merely receiving notices, the 
collection rate should show better results, but we have only annual aggregate data on fines 
collected.  
Table 4: Enforcement Effectiveness: Penalties Levied and Recovered by AEPS and AIA 
 




No. (%)  % of value 
1996–97 150  685  24%  80% 
1997–98 196  976  19%  61% 
1998–99* 186  1,512  20%  18% 
Total  532 3,173 111  1,416 
Source: AIA (1999). *April through December. 
In Table 4, note that though the penalty amounts increase, the collection rate appears to 
be falling, suggesting some erosion of authority for AIE. The number of observations is too 
limited to be sure that we are actually observing a trend, but figures point in that direction, with a 
reduction from 80% to 60% collection between 1996–97 and 1997–98. The figure for 1998–99 is 
for the first nine months of the financial year 1998–99, and it is conceivable that the firms have 
tax or other reasons for wishing to postpone payments. Nevertheless, the decline in collection 
may be attributed to AIA’s and AEPS’s lack of legal authority to impose or collect fines. As a 
consequence, the defaulting units may not feel obliged to pay.   
Although all industries should realize that it is in their common interest to collaborate, 
since their collective reputation is at stake, compliance depends on voluntary participation. This Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, and the fall in collections represents a move from an 
initial collaborative equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium. Once a few firms notice that nothing 
really bad has happened to the 20% of polluters who did not pay their fines the first year, other 
firms lose their incentive to collaborate, too.   
It is also interesting to consider the distribution of fines and payments between different 
categories of firms. As Table 4 shows, the percentage of the number of fines collected is much 
smaller than the percentage of their total value. This suggests that the larger fines, presumably 
levied on the larger firms, are typically paid, but the collection of small fines appears to be 
difficult.  
Table 5 shows the frequency with which firms receive penalty notices. 
Table 5: Frequency of Fines by Type of Firm (January–June 1998) 
 


























1 22  22  223  10.0  3  3  10  (45.5%) 
2 11  22  261  11.8  2  1  5  (45.5) 
3 9  27  508  18.8  1    7  (77.8) 
4 8  32  2,413  75.4  2  2  7  (87.5) 
5 2  10  535  53.4      2  (100.0) 
6 5  30  459  15.3      4  (80.0) 
7 4  28  843  30.1  2  1  2  (50.0) 
9 1  9 273  30.3      1  (100.0) 
10 1  10 41  4.1      1  (100.0) 
12 1  12 617 51.4      0  (0.0) 
Total 64  202  6,174  30.6  10  7  39  (60.9) 
Source: AIA (1998b). *Medium and large firms are defined as having more than 50 workers. 
Table 5 provides information on the penalty notices issued by AIA and AEPS for 
chemical oxygen demand violations for the first six months of 1998. During this period, 202 
notices were issued to 64 units, totaling Rs. 6 million. Nearly 61% of these firms were medium or 
large, which suggests that AIA is fairly objective and levies fines irrespective of the size of the 
company. Objectivity is also apparent in the fact that even plants managed by AIA executive 
members are targeted. Of the 64 units, 10 (15.6%) are or were members of the executive committee Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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of AIA at one time or other. One might argue that it is disturbing that plants managed by executive 
officers of the industrial estate are themselves found to be defaulters. For 12 units (nearly 19%), the 
default rate was very high, as they were issued at least six notices in as many months16. 
Interestingly, of these 12 units, one is still holding an executive position in the environment 
committee of AIA. Our interpretation is, however, the opposite: that there is a fair degree of 
objectivity and that corruption and nepotism do not appear to characterize the monitoring and 
enforcement system. That units managed by executive committee members are fined clearly adds to 
the credibility of the monitoring and compliance efforts.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined the ability of the Ankleshwar industrial estate and its 
association to act as an intermediary for government regulators by monitoring and disciplining 
its own members and building infrastructure for effluent treatment. The provision of these forms 
of local public goods places considerable demands on the organization to avoid the problems of 
free riding.  
We have particularly studied the provision of infrastructure and related services as well 
as the distribution of associated costs among firms, as well as the structure, implementation and 
effects of monitoring and imposition of fines. Table 6 summarizes some points of 
correspondence with Ostrom’s design principles that are prerequisites to sustainable management 
of a common pool resource. 
Table 6: Checklist of Principles for Managing Common Pool Resources 
Ostrom’s design principles  Two-tier monitoring in Ankleshwar 
1. Clearly defined membership and rights  Condition is met to a reasonable extent 
2. Rules appropriate for local conditions  Condition is met to a reasonable extent 
3. Democratic decisionmaking  Condition is met to a reasonable extent 
4. Accountable monitors  Condition is met to a reasonable extent 
5. Graduated sanctions  Condition is met 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms  No information available 
7. Government approval of institution  Condition is mostly met 
                                                 
16 The high default recurrence rate could also be due to the lack of any deterrent for the violation of chemical oxygen 
demand standards, since there are no graduated sanctions for repeated violations (see Table 1). This is also partly 
supported from the data, as there exists little relation between average penalty per notice and the number of notices 
issued (Table 5, columns 1 and 5).  Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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Although usually intended for common pool resources like fishing grounds, the first 
condition—clearly defined membership—is applicable here because all firms have membership 
rights within the industrial estate (even though there were conflicts concerning the right of 
medium and large units to benefit from the common effluent treatment plant, which was built 
with subsidies intended for small plants). Conditions 2 and 3—rules are appropriate to local 
conditions and are democratically decided—can also be considered applicable: rules are made by 
the association members, who are democratically elected by the individual units, and thus the 
participation is indirect. In practice, larger firms presumably dominate the formulation of rules, 
and when it came to the costs of effluent treatment, some small firms felt discriminated against.  
Condition 4—that monitoring be done by the members themselves or by locally 
accountable monitors—is clearly fulfilled, as is condition 5, on graduated sanctions. These 
sanctions may lead to reduced effluents, if only temporarily. The difficulty in getting units to 
actually pay fines and the lack of legal authority for the association to enforce its penalties, 
however, cast doubts on the efficacy and long-run sustainability of this system. 
Condition 6 concerns conflict resolution, and it is not clear how conflicts among 
members or between members and the association are to be handled. Last is condition 7—
government approval. Though the association is not authorized by the government to monitor 
and collect fines, there seems to be tacit approval of its efforts. Thus the industrial estate appears 
to have at least partial backing by the relevant authorities. 
Gujarat, and in particular Ankleshwar, figures prominently on the chemical-industrial 
map of India. It houses a large number of highly polluting industries with few resources or 
inclination for abatement. The local environmental authorities have a very limited budget and 
cannot hope to monitor or control pollution effectively. We have here shown that there is some 
possibility of success in a two-tier arrangement that delegates monitoring to the industry 
association. However, to supplement the traditional regulatory approach, the association must 
deal with free riding. The participants in an industrial estate are very heterogeneous and vary 
greatly in terms of assets, ownership, skills, and size; their owners or managers likewise vary in 
knowledge, educational background, and ethnicity. Such characteristics might make it more 
difficult to create the necessary conditions for long-standing collaboration than with traditional 
common pool resources like fisheries, irrigation canals, or forest meadows. 
Our description and analysis of the two-tier monitoring in Ankleshwar has, however, 
shown than most of the conditions required to manage a common property resource can also 
exist in an industrial estate setting. Industrial estates wishing to gain collective benefits need to Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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cope with free riding, solve commitment problems, have the backing of institutions, and monitor 
individual compliance. Though the analysis finds that two-tier monitoring is functional in 
Ankleshwar, there are still various enforcement difficulties.  
The cooperation of large firms in particular may be secured relatively easily by using the 
threat of public disclosures, since large firms generally value their reputations. They may even be 
so concerned about the reputation of the whole estate that they help monitor small units to avoid 
negative publicity for the estate. Olson (1965) argues that voluntary collective action by 
individuals to achieve their group interest is not possible unless there is coercion or some other 
device to make individuals behave in the group interest. As we have seen, coercion in the form 
of fines is indeed a weak point in Ankleshwar. The partial success of the monitoring activity as 
indicated by our analysis suggests that there is potential for AIE to play the role of an 
intermediate principal in a two-tier regulation game, but more data and research in this area 
would be needed to state this authoritatively. Resources for the Future  Kathuria and Sterner 
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